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Information and Communication Technologies and Skill Upgrading: 
The Role of Internal vs. External Labour Markets
* 
 
Following the adoption of information and communication technologies (ICT), firms are likely 
to face increasing skill requirements. They may react either by training or hiring the new 
skills, or by a combination of both. We first show that ICT are indeed skill biased and we then 
assess the relative importance of external and internal labour market strategies. We show 
that skill upgrading following ICT adoption takes place mostly through internal labour markets 
adjustments. The introduction of ICT is associated with an upward shift in firms’ occupational 
structure, of which one third is due to hiring and firing workers from and to the external labour 
market, whereas two-thirds are due to promotions. Moreover, we find no compelling evidence 
of external labour market strategies based on “excess turnover”. In contrast, French firms 
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Introduction 
Changes in employment relationships have attracted a lot of attention in recent years, both in 
the popular press and in academic research. Following several downsizing episodes in the 
USA and in Europe, a widely shared view has developed according to which employment 
relationships have become more instable than they used to do be. According to Doeringer and 
Piore (1971) internal labour markets are characterised by the fact that wages and career paths 
are, to a large extent, determined by a set of administrative rules rather than by pressure 
arising from the external labour market.  In contrast, in recent  years, long-term employer-
employee relationships have seemed to decline (Cappelli, 1999) and the labour market seems 
to have been increasingly working like a “spot market” (Atkinson, 1999). Correspondingly, 
the perception of job insecurity has increased in most OECD countries in the 1990s (OECD, 
2003).  
However,  existing  empirical  evidence  on  rising  job  instability  and  the  decline  of  internal 
labour markets is actually quite mixed. Regarding job instability, the US literature does not 
provide compelling evidence of any decrease in retention rates nor in job tenure (see Neumark 
et al, 1999, Jacoby, 1999, and Stevens, 2008). Regarding France, the review of the literature 
by Germe (2001) suggests that the evidence of a contraction of internal labour markets is not 
clear-cut. However, job insecurity seems to have increased in the USA over the past decades, 
whether measured in terms of involuntary job loss (Farber, 2007) or in terms of probability of 
dismissal  (Valletta,  2000).  Similar  results  are  found  on  French  data.  Givord  and  Maurin 
(2004) and Behaghel (2003) indeed find evidence of an upward trend in annual transition 
rates from employment to unemployment between the mid-1970s and the early 2000s.  
So, evidence on the potential decline of internal labour markets is far from being clear-cut. 
One reason for this may be that internal labour markets are efficient organisations in the 
presence  of  match-specific  investments,  transaction  costs  and  workers'  risk  aversion  (see 
Wachter et al, 1990) which are unlikely to have disappeared altogether. Another reason may 
have to do with the rapid development of information and communication technologies (ICT) 
over the past 20 years. Although these changes have often been seen as potential causes of a 
decline in internal labour markets, this actually depends on how they impact human resource 
management,  in  particular  through  new  and  increasing  skill  requirements.  The  recent 
literature  on  the  skill  content  of  technological  change  suggests  that  information  and 
communication technologies substitute workers in routine tasks, whereas they complement 
them in interactive and analytical activities (see Autor et al., 2003, and Spitz-Oener, 2006).     4/36 
The impact of such changes on the skill level of the workforce may however vary across jobs 
or  sectors.  Ben-Ner  and  Urtasun  (2010)  suggest  that  ICT  could  generate  some  "skill 
bifurcation": it would eventually raise the skill level of workers in complex jobs whereas it 
would have a deskilling effect on workers in low-skilled jobs. Nonetheless, available evidence 
suggests  that,  on  average,  ICT  adoption  generates  an  increase  in  the  demand  for 
communication and analytical skills (see Autor et al, 2003).  
Firms may cope with it in various ways. They may either hire the new skills on the external 
labour market or train their own workers, thus relying on the working of the internal labour 
market. Hiring the new skills from outside the firm may actually take two forms. Firms may 
hire more highly skilled workers and get rid of less skilled ones, which generates an upward 
shift in the occupational structure. Alternatively, they may hire new workers within a constant 
occupational structure in order to bring "fresh blood", and presumably new skills, into their 
workforce. A number of recent papers have investigated the impact of new technologies on 
changes in the occupational structure within firms, worker flows or training. They find a 
positive  impact  of  technical  (and  organisational)  change  on  the  employment  or  wage-bill 
share  of  the  more  highly  skilled  occupations  (see  Chennells  and  Van  Reenen,  2002  and  
Caroli  and  Van  Reenen,  2001).  On  U.S.  data,  Neumark  and  Reed  (2004)  display  a 
significantly  greater  use  of  contingent  employment  relationships  in  new-economy  jobs. 
Regarding worker flows, Givord and Maurin (2004) find that the use of new technologies 
increases  the  annual  transition  rate  from  employment  to  unemployment,  and  that  this  is 
enough to explain the global trend toward greater job insecurity observed in France. Looking 
at worker flows by skill levels in France, Askenazy and Moreno-Galbis (2007) find that firms 
that most intensely use new technologies and innovative work practices experience a higher 
turnover among most of the occupational categories. For Germany, Bauer and Bender (2003) 
find that new technologies increase churning rates for skilled and highly skilled workers and 
that most of the employment adjustment patterns associated with technological change are 
due to hiring and firing rather than to promotions or demotions. These results suggest that, if 
anything, firms meet the new skill requirements following the introduction of ICT through 
adjustments on the external rather than internal labour market. 
However, another strand of literature suggests that the adoption of information technologies 
and innovative workplace practices  also raises  firms' investment in training. On US data, 
Lynch  and  Black  (1998)  find  that  the  proportion  of  workers  receiving  formal  training  is 
higher in firms that use high performance work practices. Behaghel and Greenan (2010) use     5/36 
matched employer-employee data for France and also find that a more innovative organisation 
increases the probability that workers receive training, even once controlling for selection and 
potential endogeneity biases.  
As underlined by this review of the literature, most articles consider only one type of labour 
market response to technological change. They either study internal or external labour market 
strategies, but rarely both at the same time. However, as suggested by Mincer (1989), these 
strategies  are  likely  to  be  correlated  with  each  other.  Firms  may  react  to  increasing  skill 
requirements either by combining in some way training with the hiring of new skills or they 
may, on the contrary, rely on one strategy at the expense of the other. The characteristics of 
this choice and its determinants are the focus of the present paper.  
Investigating this issue on France at the end of the 1990s is of particular interest because ICT 
were still spreading quite quickly  across firms,  while in other countries, like the  USA, a 
majority of firms had already transited to ICT-intensive production processes. To the extent 
that we are interested in how firms cope with the new skill requirements arising from the 
implementation  of  ICT,  France  in  the  late  90s  provides  an  interesting  case  to  research. 
Moreover, together with Japan, France used to be one of the Western countries in which 
internal labour markets were the most widespread (Marsden, 1999). It is therefore one of the 
countries in which the development of ICT is likely to have had the most devastating effect on 
long-term employment relations if new technologies call for an ongoing reshuffling of the 
workforce. At the same time, internal labour markets may have been protected by the strength 
of employment protection legislation. According to the OECD indicator (Venn, 2009), France 
is one of the countries with the highest level of employment protection. This is particularly 
the case for temporary contracts which can be used only under very strict conditions and for a 
limited amount of time. This may have made internal labour markets more sustainable in a 
period of rapid technical change. 
In  order  to  assess  the  resilience  of  internal  labour  markets  in  a  context  of  technological 
changes, we consider three ways through which firms may increase the skill level of their 
workforce, whenever necessary:  
1)  They  may  shift  their  occupational  structure  upward,  which  can  be  done  either  by 
promoting  incumbent  workers  from  lower  to  higher  skilled  occupations  (internal 
labour  market  strategy)  or  alternatively,  by  hiring  workers  in  more  highly  skilled 
occupations and/or firing them in less skilled ones (external labour market strategy).     6/36 
2)  External labour market adjustments may also take the form of "excess turnover" (or 
churning) – i.e. turnover in excess to what is necessary to upgrade the occupational 
structure – if firms try to acquire new skills by the adjunction of "fresh" workers.  
3)  Eventually, firms may train their own workers, thus relying on the internal labour 
market. 
According  to  the  relative  importance  of  these  channels,  we  will  be  able  to  assess  how 
important internal labour market strategies remain in a period of rapid expansion of new ICT 
or, alternatively, to what extent external labour market strategies have taken over.
1 
The  paper  is  organised  as  follows.  Section  1  outlines  the  econometric  model.  Section  2 
introduces the data. The results are presented in Section 3. Some discussion and concluding 
remarks are offered in Section 4. 
 
1. The Econometric model 
New technologies and skill upgrading 
The existing literature on skill-biased technical change suggests that in order to fully exploit 
the potential of ICT, firms have to upgrade the skill level of their workforce when adopting 
them. The corresponding prediction is that there should be a positive correlation (all other 
things kept equal) between the adoption of more advanced technologies and an increase in the 
skill level of the workforce.  
A very simple test is based on the following regression: 
i i i i ICT z SKILL e d D b D + + =          (1) 
where DICT is an indicator of adoption of new information and communication technologies, 
SKILL is a measure of the workforce’s skills, and z are control variables.  
ICT  adoption  is  likely  to  be  endogenous.  In  the  absence  of  any  good  instrument  for 
technological adoption, we interpret positive estimates  d ˆ  as evidence of partial correlations 
between the adoption of new technologies and upward changes in the skill structure of the 
workforce – see Section 4 for further discussion of endogeneity issues.  
                                                 
1 Note that these three channels may overlap; for instance, firms may promote workers they train. However, as 
shown in the next section, shifts in the occupational structure can be decomposed in shifts through internal 
movements  and  shifts  through  external  movements,  thus  providing  a  natural  metric  to  assess  the  relative 
importance of internal and external movements.      7/36 
Skills, however, can be acquired through a variety of channels. In what follows, we consider 
three  possible  channels:  firms  may  upgrade  the  occupational  structure  of  their  workforce 
(which can be achieved though entries and exits or, alternatively through promotions); they 
may rely on excess turnover in order to acquire fresh skills; and/or, they may train their own 
workers. We interpret upward changes in the occupational structure through entries and exits 
as well as excess turnover as indicators of external labour market adjustments. Conversely, 
skill  upgrading  through  promotions  and  training  are  seen  as  indicators  of  internal  labour 
market strategies. 
 
Decomposing changes in the occupational structure 
Changes in firms' occupational structure in relation with ICT adoption are usually estimated 
using standard labour share equations:  
i p i p i ip ICT x S e d D b D + + =           (2) 
where xi is a vector of control variables and Sip is the share of occupational group p in the 
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Such changes are the outcome of two different movements: (i) entries and exits of workers at 
various levels of the occupational structure and (ii) promotions of workers from lower to 
higher occupations. In order to distinguish both effects, we construct counterfactual changes 
in labour shares ( ip S
~
D ) describing what would have happened to the occupational structure if 
there  had  only  been  entries  and  exits  at  the  different  occupational  levels,  but  no  internal 

































= D         (3) 
where 
ip
t L 1 -  is the number of workers in occupation p in firm i at time t-1, 
ip
t H  is the number 
of entries in occupation p in firm i between time t-1 and t and 
ip
t E  is the number of workers 
formerly employed in occupation p leaving firm i between time t-1 and t. Similarly, 
i
t L , 
i
t H , 
and 
i
t E  respectively denote the total number of workers, entries and exits in firm i at time t.      8/36 
Given that we do not have any direct information on promotions, changes in the occupational 
structure  through  promotions  only  ( ip S ˆ D )  are  defined  as  the  changes  in  the  occupational 
structure that would have occurred if there had been none of the entries or exits that we 




























= D         (4) 
where 
ip
t L  is the number of workers in occupation p in firm i at time t. The number of workers 
in  occupation  p  at  t  is  computed  as  a  counterfactual  including  only  promotions,  i.e.  the 
number of workers observed at t in occupation p minus entries plus exits into that group 
between t-1 and t. The corresponding labour share is computed by dividing this number of 
workers by what employment would have been in the firm at year t if no entry nor exit had 
taken place over the period.  
In the case where the total level of employment is constant
2, the observed changes are the sum 
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Let us underline that our counterfactual measures of changes in the occupational structure 
( ip S ˆ D  and  ip S
~
D ) closely relate to standard worker flow rates (see Davis and Haltiwanger, 
1999 for a survey). The main difference between both is that in the former, flows are defined 
with respect to the total size of the workforce, whereas in the latter, they are defined with 














= D .             
This differs from the standard external worker flow rate EWFR: 
                                                 
2 When total employment is not constant, the coefficients we obtain for  ip S ˆ D  and  ip S
~
D do not add up to those 
obtained when using  ip S D as a dependent variable. This is due to the fact that a complete decomposition of 
ip S D   should  include  a  third  term,  namely  the  interaction  between  changes  due  to  internal  and  external 
movements. We choose to neglect this term which has no clear interpretation with respect to the internal vs 
external labour market issue. It turns out to be very small in practice: the coefficients on  ip S ˆ D  and  ip S
~
D almost 
add up in our regressions. Robustness checks showing that alternative additive decompositions yield almost 
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t L L 1 1/ - - .  In  other  words,  the  key  difference  lies  in  the  fact  that  we 




t L L 1 1/ - - . 
This serves our purpose by providing a direct measure of the impact of worker flows on the 
firm’s occupational structure. 
We estimate equation (2) separately for  ip S
~




Upgrading skills through excess turnover and training 
Another  way  to  upgrade  the  skill  structure  of  a  firm  when  adopting  ICT  is  through  the 
addition  of  "fresh"  workers  by  means  of  labour  turnover.  Turnover  is,  to  some  extent,  a 
mechanical consequence of the upgrading of the occupational structure through entries/exits: 
there cannot be any upgrading of the occupational structure through entries/exits if there are 
no worker flows. However, as is well known from the literature on job and worker flows (for 
French  firms,  see  Abowd,  Corbel  and  Kramarz,  2003),  worker  flows  (turnover)  usually 
largely exceed what is needed for a given level of job flows.  
We therefore use a measure of ‘excess turnover’ – or churning -, i.e. turnover in excess to 
what is needed for a given change in the size of a group of workers. Specifically, following 














º        (5) 
We then estimate: 
ip p i p i ip v ICT x et + + = g D x         (6) 
by OLS separately for each occupation, where xi is a vector of control variables.  p ˆ g is the 
estimate of interest; positive values indicate that ICT adoption is associated with an increased 
                                                 
3 Although we are estimating a system of Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR), feasible Generalized Least 
Squares (FGLS) are not warranted here, as the same regressors show up in each equation (see, e.g., Theorem 7.6 
in Wooldridge, 2002).     10/36 
turnover of group p, beyond what is mechanically implied by the upgrading of occupational 
groups. 
Similarly, skill upgrading through training needs to be analysed within each occupational 
group.  Indeed,  training  rates  are  higher  in  high-skill  groups,  hence  upgrading  of  the 
occupational  structure  through  entries/exits  mechanically  generates  an  increase  in  training 
rates. Our data allows us to estimate training equations for a given occupational group: 
ip p i p i ip ICT x T u h D y + + =         (7) 
which we estimate by OLS. xi is a vector of control variables and  p ˆ h  is the estimate of 
interest; positive values indicate that ICT adoption is associated with an increase in training, 
once controlled for composition effects. 
 
2. The Data 
Measuring technology adoption and skill upgrading through our 3 channels at the firm level 
requires combining several databases.  
Our main information on ICT comes from the REPONSE survey (RElations PrOfessionnelles 
et  NégocationS  d’Entreprise).  In  1998,  2978  establishments  were  surveyed  with  senior 
managers  being  asked  questions  about  industrial  relations,  implementation  of  new 
technologies and reorganisations. Regarding ICT, we have information on the proportion of 
workers using the Intranet
4 and the Internet in 1998 (no use, less than 5%, 5 to 19%, 20 to 
49%, 50% and more). Given that these technologies were at the very beginning of their life 
cycle in France in the mid-1990s, we assume that the proportion of workers using them in 
1998  provides  a  good  approximation  of  technological  adoption  over  1996-1998.  More 
specifically, we define a dummy variable equal to 1 if at least 5% of the workers use the 
Internet  or  at  least  20%  of  the  workers  use  the  Intranet
5.  One  advantage  of  this  simple 
measure of ITC use is that it is relevant for the different sectors in the economy: as shown by 
                                                 
4 The exact phrasing is "Intranet and computer networks". 
5 Using a binary variable discards part of the information available in the 5x5 levels of adoption that are obtained 
by combining the original Internet and Intranet variables. However, our sample is too small for estimating the 
effects of all these combinations separately. We choose to focus on the 5% and 20% thresholds as a way to 
contrast reasonably balanced groups of ITC early adopters (1/3 of the sample) and late (or non) adopting firms 
(2/3 of the sample), thus giving us good statistical power. Computing a more continuous index may lead to 
misspecifications as we would have to make linearity assumptions (with little statistical power to test them). We 
checked that our results are robust to the thresholds we use to generate the ICT adoption indicator.     11/36 
table A, in our sample, very similar proportions of firms in the manufacturing and service 
sectors are classified as “ICT-intensive” by this measure (about one third).  
In addition to ICT, the REPONSE survey also provides detailed information on firms and 
establishments  which  we  use  as  control  variables  in  the  regressions:  firm  characteristics 
(public/private,  firm  with  one  or  several  plants,  listed  on  stock  markets/non-listed),  plant 
characteristics  (share  of  women,  share  of  part-time  workers,  presence  of  union  delegates, 
employment growth, local labour market density), as well as a set of industry and plant size 
dummies.  
In order to capture worker flows, we rely on two different sources. The DMMO (Données sur 
les Mouvements de Main-d’Oeuvre) has exhaustive data on entries and exits of workers in 
and out of establishments with 50 employees or more. The data is broken down into four 
occupational categories: managers and professionals
6, technicians and supervisors, clerks and 
blue-collars.  The  EMMO  (Enquête  sur  les  Mouvements  de  Main-d’Oeuvre)  has  identical 
information on a representative sample of firms with less than 50 employees. We use this data 
to compute counterfactual changes in labour shares over 1996-1998, i.e. changes that are due 
only to entries and exits (resp. promotions) in the various occupations over the period. In 
order  to  do  so  –  see  equations  (3)  and  (4)  –  we  also  use  information  on  the  level  of 
employment in each occupational cell at the beginning and at the end of the period. This 
information is provided by the French survey of employment structure: the ESE (Enquête 
Structure des Emplois), as of December 31
st 1995 and 1998. 
The last channel we consider for skill upgrading is training. The so-called “24-83” fiscal 
records provide firm-level data on the number of workers receiving training and the volume 
of  training  hours
7.  This  information  is  obviously  quite  limited  since  it  only  refers  to 
continuous and formal training. In particular, apprenticeship is excluded whereas it may be an 
important skill source (see Bellman and Janik, 2007 and Ryan et al, 2007) which may be, in 
some  cases,  complementary  to  internal  labour  markets  (see  Soskice,  1994,  on  Germany). 
Similarly, informal on-the-job training is not included in our data although it may represent an 
important part of training, in particular in small firms (see Barron et al, 1997)
8. This is a clear 
limitation of the 24-83 records. Unfortunately, we are not aware of any data source that would 
provide more exhaustive information on training in France. Using the information available in 
                                                 
6 This category also includes engineers.  
7 The "24-83" records provide firm rather than plant-level data on training. Matching them with establishment-
level data generates some measurement error that is likely to raise the standard errors in our estimates. 
8 In order to prevent this from biasing our results, we systematically control for plant size in our regressions.      12/36 
the  24-83,  we  compute  both  the  proportion  of  workers  receiving  some  training  and  the 
average number of training hours per worker for four occupational categories - identical to 
those  in  the  DMMO-EMMO  database.  These  are  averaged  over  1996-1998  in  order  to 
account for the fact that training may take some time to be implemented after firms decide to 
invest in it.  
Matching the four datasets and cleaning out establishments with implausible values for skill 
upgrading reduces our sample to 1,114 establishments. The low matching rate is primarily 
due  to  the  fact  that  the  EMMO  and  24-83  sources  are  not  exhaustive  (respectively,  not 
systematically coded) – see the Data Appendix for details.  
Table  A  in  the  Appendix  summarizes  all  the  variables  used  in  our  models.  Our  sample 
consists  mainly  of  large  plants  (53%  have  more  than  200  workers)  belonging  to  multi-
establishment firms of the private sector. 77% have a union delegate and less than half of 
them are listed. The manufacturing sector is over-represented in our sample: it accounts for 
80%  of  total  employment,  compared  to  only  20%  in  the  whole  French  economy.  As  a 
consequence, women account for only 35% of the labour force. 37% of the plants employ 
more than 5% of part-time workers.  
 
3. Results 
3.1 ICT adoption and skill upgrading strategies 
We first investigate the correlation between ICT adoption and the strategies used by firms to 
upgrade the skills of their workforce. In order to do so, we estimate equations (2)-(4), (6) and 
(7) of our model.  
Table 1 presents the results for the various forms of skill upgrading: respectively, upward 
shift in the occupational structure through entries/exits versus promotions, excess turnover 
and training. Panel A of Table 1 provides evidence of skill-biased technical change. The use 
of the Internet or the Intranet is positively correlated with an upward shift in the occupational 
structure and, more specifically with an increase in the proportion of managers, engineers and 
professionals and a decrease in the proportion of clerks in the workforce. This occupational 
upgrading is essentially achieved through internal movements (promotions). These account 
for more than 70% of the increase in the proportion of managers – as compared to only 30%     13/36 
for external movements - and for almost all of the reduction in the share of clerks
9 – see 
Panels B and C. This first set of results suggests that internal labour markets still play an 
important  role  when  firms  have  to  cope  with  increasing  skill  requirements.  Most  of  the 
adjustment in the occupational structure takes place through promotions, whereas the relative 
importance of entries and exits to and from the external labour market remains limited. To 
gauge the economic significance of the effects, it is useful to compare them to the average 
changes in the occupational structure in our sample during the 1996-1998 period (Table A). 
For instance, the .80 percentage point increase in the share of managers and professionals 
occurring through internal movements and associated with intensive ICT-use (Table 1) is very 
close to the overall increase in the share of managers and professionals in the economy (+.77 
percentage points). If we were to give a causal interpretation to the estimates, a back-of-the-
envelop calculation would imply that about 35% of the overall increase in the demand for 
managers and professionals is due to the adoption of ICT that occurred in about 1/3 of the 
firms  over  the  period  and  which  was  satisfied  through  internal  movements 
(0.33*.80/0.77=0.34);  about  15%  is  due  to  the  adoption  of  ICT  but  was  satisfied  by  the 
external labour market (.33*.3/0.77=.13); and the remaining 50% is due to other causes. Of 
course, our estimates cannot necessarily be interpreted causally; but this suggests that the role 
of internal labour markets is far from negligible in the overall upgrading of the occupational 
structure.  
Firms may also try to upgrade the skill level of their workforce by bringing in "fresh workers" 
with  new  skills,  beyond  what  would  be  necessary  to  upgrade  the  occupational  structure 
through entries and exits. Panel D of Table 1 investigates the partial correlations between ICT 
adoption and excess turnover. We find no compelling evidence of such a correlation: the use 
of the Internet or the Intranet is not associated with excess turnover, whatever the category of 
workers we consider. Overall, the external labour market does not appear as a key provider of 
new skills when firms introduce new information and communication technologies.   
In contrast, firms heavily rely on training in order to upgrade the skill level of their workforce. 
Panels E and F of Table 1 have the partial correlations between ICT adoption on the one hand 
and  two  different  measures  of  training  on  the  other  hand.  As  evidenced  by  Panel  E,  the 
introduction  of  new  technologies  is  correlated  with  a  greater  access  to  training  for  all 
categories of workers except for managers and professionals - where the coefficient is positive 
                                                 
9 Note that, given that our occupational categories are quite broad, we do not take into account all promotions. 
Those occurring from one level to the next one within a given occupational category are not recorded, so that our 
results on the scope of promotion should be seen as a lower bound.      14/36 
but not statistically significant. In contrast, when considering the number of hours of training 
per worker, the correlation is positive and significant for all occupational groups, including 
managers. Again, it is useful to compare the effects to the average level of training in the 
sample displayed in Table A. Depending on the occupation, ICT adoption is associated with 
an increase in the incidence of training by 5 to 15%, and an increase in training hours by 10 to 
15%.  
This first set of results suggests that the internal labour market still plays a key role in the 
adjustment of the skill level of the workforce in firms that intensely use new information and 
communication technologies. This is confirmed if using alternative indicators of internal and 
external  labour  market  strategies.  If  estimating  the  correlation  between  ICT  adoption  and 
entry and exit rates in the various occupations (see Table 2 – Panel 2.1), we do not find any 
significant association except for the hiring of technicians and supervisors and, to a lower 
extent, for managers and professionals. This is consistent with the reduced role of external 
labour  market  strategies  which  play  a  role  only  through  upgrading  firms'  occupational 
structure at the higher end – see Table 1 panel C. In contrast, when estimating the correlation 
between ICT adoption and promotion rates to managerial positions, we do find a significant 
association, in particular if considering promotions from the three lowest skilled groups (blue-
collars, clerks, technicians and supervisors) to managers and professionals – see Table 2 – 
Panel 2.2. Promotions from technicians and supervisors to managers are also more frequent in 
ICT intensive firms. This is also the case for promotions from the two lowest skilled groups 
(blue-collars  and  clerks)  to  the  highest  two  (technicians  and  supervisors;  managers  and 
professionals) although the correlation is not significant at conventional levels. 
In order to check the robustness of our findings, we try several alternative specifications
10. 
We first show that the importance of promotions as compared to external movements is not 
sensitive to the decomposition method that we use. We also show that our results are robust to 
controlling for employment growth at the plant level, to using alternative measures of ICT 
(different thresholds for ICT adoption or, alternatively, the share of ICT investment in value-
added) and to controlling for investment in physical capital. We are also concerned that our 
findings could be driven by potentially confounding factors such as the use of innovative 
workplace practices (proxied by quality circles, stimulation of workers' participation) or to the 
quality of industrial relations (proxied by the number of strikes). We show that this is not the 
case and that our results remain unchanged if controlling for such factors.  
                                                 
10 Detailed results are available from the authors upon request.      15/36 
The important role of the internal labour market in upgrading the skill level of the workforce 
therefore seems to be quite resilient in France, even in the context of development of new 
ICT. One can wonder however whether this form of human resource management is to be 
found in all firms or whether there is some heterogeneity in firms' strategies and along which 
dimensions. 
 
3.2 Heterogeneity in firms' skill upgrading strategies 
A  first  potential  dimension  of  heterogeneity  in  our  data  has  to  do  with  industry.  Skill 
upgrading practices are likely to be different across sectors, if anything because the needs and 
the relative cost of each strategy are likely to be different. Given the fact that our sample over-
represents the manufacturing sector, our results may not be representative of the average trend 
in the French economy. A disaggregated analysis is therefore needed.  
When splitting our sample across manufacturing and services, our results suggest that there 
are  indeed  some  differences,  in  particular  with  respect  to  the  use  of  training.  Table  3.1 
suggests that ICT-intensive firms in the manufacturing sector heavily rely on promotions in 
order to upgrade the skill level of their workforce. Excess turnover is used to a limited extent 
for clerks and blue-collars. But the dominant strategy is based on training with ICT-intensive 
firms providing significantly more training than others to all categories of workers. Regarding 
services (see Table 3.2), the same pattern is observed for changes in the occupational structure 
with promotions accounting for most of the skill upgrading. In contrast, firms in the service 
sectors appear to rely rather little on training when using ICT, the only significant correlation 
being for blue-collars.  
This heterogeneity in skill upgrading strategies across sectors is, to a large extent, robust to 
taking into account other potential sources of heterogeneity (see Table 4). The skill upgrading 
strategies chosen by firms are likely to vary across a variety of dimensions. In particular, one 
would expect internal labour markets to be larger and better organised in large firms than in 
smaller ones. In contrast, the external labour market is potentially more attractive in high-
density local labour markets because it is likely to offer a greater variety of skills. Eventually, 
skill upgrading strategies may be different between high and low-tech sectors
11 because the 
use of the Internet/Intranet is likely to be different in both types of industries. 
                                                 
11 Sectors are classified as being low or high-tech on the basis of the latest OECD 4-digit classification for 
manufacturing sectors (see Hatzichronoglou, 1997) and on the basis of the 4-digit classification proposed by the     16/36 
Our  results  suggest  that  there  is  indeed  some  heterogeneity  across  several  of  these 
dimensions. The direct effects of the size and local labour market density variables suggest 
that these affect to a certain extent firm's skill upgrading strategies. Large firms essentially 
rely on promotions to upgrade the occupational structure of their workforce (in favour of 
technicians and supervisors and, to a lesser extent at the expense of clerks) and they rely less 
on excess turnover for both categories. More importantly, training is strongly correlated with 
size with large firms providing greater access and more training hours to all categories of 
workers. Interestingly, being located on a high-density local labour market is correlated with a 
lower turnover for technicians and clerks, which is not in line with the idea that high density 
on the local labour market should make external skill upgrading strategies more attractive to 
firms. Eventually, belonging to a high-tech sector does not seem to be strongly associated 
with firms' skill strategies. The only exception is that the high-tech variable is negatively 
correlated with excess turnover for blue-collars and positively correlated with the number of 
training hours for clerks (at the 10% level). 
Moreover, the correlation between ICT adoption and skill upgrading strategies is sometimes 
quite different across firm size, type of local labour market and technological level of the 
sector.  This  is  the  message  conveyed  by  the  coefficients  we  get  on  the  interaction  terms 
between Internet/Intranet and our control variables. The density of the local labour market 
tends  to  increase  the  reliance  of  ICT-intensive  firms  upon  promotion,  in  particular  for 
managers  and  blue-collars  (at  the  10%  significance  level),  contrary  to  what  could  be 
expected.
12 However, it also increases firms' reliance on excess turnover for technicians and 
clerks when adopting ICT, which is consistent with the idea that denser labour markets offer a 
wider choice of skills and are thus likely to better fit firms' needs. In contrast, skill upgrading 
strategies associated with the use of ICT do not seem to be very heterogeneous across firm 
size, except for promotions which tend to be relatively more important for clerks and less so 
for technicians (at the 10% level). Similarly, being in high rather than low-tech sectors does 
not  massively  affect  the  skill  upgrading  strategies  of  ICT-intensive  firms.  One  exception, 
however, is that the latter provide more training hours (at the 10% level) to technicians and 
blue-collars in high-tech sectors. 
                                                                                                                                                          
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions for service sectors (see European 
Monitoring Center on Change, 2006). 
12 A tentative explanation could be that, if in dense local labour markets, firms are able to hire workers that 
match their needs more closely; these successful “matches” are then more likely to lead to promotions.     17/36 
The differences between manufacturing and services are essentially robust to the introduction 
of these additional controls. The increase in the share of managers and technicians is smaller 
in  ICT-intensive service firms than in  ICT-intensive manufacturing firms, but there is no 
difference in the respective roles of promotions versus external movements in achieving these 
changes. One important difference which was not striking when splitting the sample across 
sectors  is  that  labour  turnover  is  much  higher  in  services  than  in  manufacturing  for  all 
categories of workers. The specificity of services with respect to training is confirmed: ICT-
intensive firms rely less on training for all categories of workers, with the coefficients being 
significant for managers and, to a lesser extent, for blue-collars (when considering training 
hours). One reason for this may be the high level of turnover. If the type of training required 
when firms adopt ICT is more costly than usual, it may well be the case that service firms are 
more  reluctant  to  train  their  workers  given  their  higher  probability  to  leave  than  in  the 
manufacturing  sector.  The  causation  may  also  go  the  other  way  round  in  some  services. 
Wherever jobs are low-quality and low-paid, training is scarce. In such cases, it may well be 
poor job quality that leads to high labour turnover, rather than the other way round. 
Overall, our results highlight some heterogeneity in the skill upgrading strategies of firms that 
have adopted ICT. Nonetheless, the message conveyed by our results is that the reliance on 
internal labour markets remains quite widespread in France even in firms that have adopted 
new information and communication technologies. 
 
4. Discussion and concluding remarks 
In this paper, we have taken a fresh look at the fate of internal labour markets in a period of 
rapid technological change. Our results suggest that they vividly resist in France even in firms 
that have introduced information and communication technologies.  
As already evidenced by many papers in the literature, ICT adoption is associated with an 
upward shift in firm's occupational structure. But we show that in our sample, this is largely 
achieved through promotions rather than entries and exits from and to the external labour 
market. Moreover, when introducing new technologies, firms massively rely on training in 
order to upgrade the skill level of their workforce, whereas the use of excess turnover as a 
provider of new skills remains very limited. This resistance of internal labour markets even 
where ICT are intensely used is widespread across firms, whatever their size or technological     18/36 
level.  It  is  slightly  stronger  in  low-density  labour  markets  and  in  manufacturing  where 
training is more frequently used than in services to increase the skill level of workers.  
Let us underline that, as all the literature on skill-biased technical change, our results only 
capture the short-term relationship between ICT adoption and skill upgrading strategies. If 
there are lags in the way ICT affect firms' skill structure, our results will capture at most what 
happens in the first two years following the shock (given that we are working on the 1996-
1998 period).  
We also need to insist upon the fact that our estimates do not prove a causal relationship: 
although we introduce a rich set of controls to rule out some of the most likely sources of 
spurious correlations, the ICT variable remains potentially endogenous and we are not able to 
exhibit plausible instruments to solve that problem. Nonetheless, our results suggest that the 
intensive  use  of  ICT  does  not  preclude  human  resource  management  strategies  based  on 
internal labour markets: internal labour markets and ICT can coexist. Moreover, our findings 
make  a  large  negative  impact  of  ICT  on  internal  labour  markets  rather  unlikely.  Indeed, 
reconciling a large negative causal impact with our finding of a robust, positive correlation 
would require that some unobserved variables create a large upward bias in our estimates. Let 
us consider two types of mechanisms that could generate such a bias, and examine whether 
they are consistent with the evidence we provide. 
The first mechanism is one of spurious correlations due to unobserved shocks at the firm 
level. A first possibility would be that firms that are hit by unfavourable shocks (say, a falling 
demand for their product) have to cut costs. To that end, they adopt cost saving technologies; 
they  also  downsize,  and  the  burden  of  the  adjustment  is  disproportionately  born  by  the 
unskilled. This sequence of events would generate a spurious correlation between ICT and 
upgrading of the occupational structure through entries and exits. Therefore, wrongly ignoring 
the  potential  role  of  unobserved  shocks  would  make  us  overestimate  the  external  labour 
market response to ICT adoption. This rather reinforces our result on the predominance of 
internal adjustments. However, unobserved shocks may also work the other way round. Firms 
that are hit by a positive shock may introduce new technologies (because they have more cash 
available for investment). They may also mechanically increase their training investment: The 
French regulation on the financing of continuous training is such that over the 1996-1998 
period, all firms had to spend at least 1.5% of their wage bill on training. For the firms for 
which this constraint is binding, any positive shock that raises the wage bill will mechanically 
generate an increase in training expenditure. In this case, the positive correlation we find     19/36 
between new technologies and training may be spurious. In order to check whether this is the 
case, we re-ran our training regressions on the sub-sample of firms spending more than 2% of 
their wage bill on training. For these firms, the legal minimum is not binding so there is no 
reason that an increase in their wage bill should lead them to invest more in training. When 
doing this, our results are virtually unchanged
13. Of course, one can imagine other sources of 
unobserved heterogeneity that would drive the results spuriously. Bloom et al. (2008) suggest 
that the origin of capital could be one of them. They show that US multinationals operating in 
Europe are more IT-intensive than non-US multinationals (and get a higher productivity from 
IT) and that their IT advantage is primarily due to more efficient human resource management 
practices. In order to make sure that our correlation between IT and internal labour market 
strategies is not driven by US-owned firms, we controlled for the origin of capital (US versus 
non-US) in our baseline regression. The results are left unchanged. Of course, this does not 
rule out other possible sources of unobserved heterogeneity. This is why we remain cautious 
in interpreting our results.  
The second mechanism is related to a policy change that took place in France in the mid 
1990s. Starting in 1993, successive governments have introduced fiscal measures to reduce 
the labour cost of low-wage workers. These payroll tax cuts have had the largest impact on 
firms employing a high proportion of low-skill workers. As a result, these firms were less 
induced to adopt new technologies (as long as they are substitutes to unskilled labour) while 
they  had  incentives  to  hire  even  more  low-skill  workers.  Again,  this  would  lead  us  to 
overestimate  the  impact  of  ICT  adoption  on  external  adjustments:  the  share  of  low-skill 
workers would increase through entries and exits in firms less prone to adopt ICT. The impact 
of the payroll taxes on internal adjustments is unclear. Low-wage firms might refrain from 
promoting and training their workers, by fear of increasing wages above the level eligible for 
the  tax  exemption.  This,  however,  does  not  concern  high-wage  workers  whose  training 
appears to be highly correlated with new technologies in our data. Moreover, the additional 
contingents of low-wage workers paid at the minimum wage would probably not get much 
wage increase following training, given that their productivity would, most probably, remain 
below the minimum wage. Overall, it is unclear whether the payroll tax cuts should have 
induced lower training and fewer promotions in firms less likely to adopt ICT. Therefore, it is 
                                                 
13  The  coefficients  (standard  errors) of  the  Internet/Intranet  variable  in  the  regression  for  the  proportion  of 
trainees are: 4.15 (2.18) for managers and professionals, 8.61 (3.83) for technicians and supervisors, 4.87 (2.39) 
for clerks and 3.72 (2.97) and for blue-collars. The coefficients (standard errors) of the Internet/Intranet variable 
in the regression for the intensity of training are: 2.38 (1.13) for managers and professionals, 3.09 (1.11) for 
technicians and supervisors, 1.77 (0.95) for clerks and 2.45 (0.92) for blue-collars.     20/36 
unclear why our finding of a positive correlation between ICT and internal labour market 
strategies should be driven by this policy change. 
Overall, we view our results as providing evidence that internal labour markets have remained 
a viable human resource management strategy  for French firms even  when adopting new 
information and communication technologies. A question raised by these results is to what 
extent  they  may  be  generalised.  France  is  indeed  characterised  by  strict  employment 
protection  legislation  (Venn,  2009)  and  this  may  be  the  very  reason  why  internal  labour 
markets  have  survived:  firms  would  rely  on  internal  adjustments  because  going  on  the 
external labour market would simply be too costly. In that case, the resilience of internal 
labour markets in a context of rapid ICT expansion would be largely idiosyncratic or, at least, 
specific to high-EPL countries. The evidence we provide does not quite go in that direction. 
We indeed find strong differences in internal labour market adjustments across manufacturing 
and services – with more training being used in the former and more labour turnover in the 
latter - whereas both sectors face the same employment protection legislation. Similarly, the 
reliance on external adjustments varies according to the density of the local labour market 
whereas EPL is equally strict all over the French territory. As a consequence, EPL cannot 
entirely  account  for  the  resilience  of  internal  labour  markets  in  France.  Moeover,  recent 
evidence by Bassanini et al. (2007) suggests that the amount of training provided by firms 
would actually be negatively correlated to employment protection legislation. In order to get a 
better understanding of these relations, a direct comparison of France with other countries 
would be potentially very fruitful. This appears to be a promising avenue for future research.     21/36 
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supervisors  Clerks  Blue collars 
         
  A. Overall changes in the occupational structure 
         
Internet/Intranet  1.13***  -0.12  -0.65**  -0.36 
  (0.22)  (0.30)  (0.30)  (0.34) 
         
Obs  1 114  1 114  1 114  1 114 
         
  B. Internal movements 
         
Internet/Intranet  0.80***  0.12  -0.58*  -0.34 
  (0.20)  (0.31)  (0.30)  (0.32) 
         
Obs  1 114  1 114  1 114  1 114 
         
  C. External movements 
         
Internet/Intranet  0.30*  -0.26  -0.04  0.00 
  (0.17)  (0.22)  (0.20)  (0.25) 
         
Obs  1 114  1 114  1 114  1 114 
         
  D. Excess turnover 
         
Internet/Intranet  1.18  3.15  9.52  -7.70 
  (1.98)  (2.56)  (6.89)  (13.82) 
         
Obs  1 090  1 094  1 104  1 046 
         
  E. Number of trainees (per 100 workers) 
         
Internet/Intranet  3.40  7.43**  5.50***  3.81* 
  (2.06)  (3.14)  (1.93)  (2.31) 
         
Obs  1 097  1 052  1 087  909 
         
  F. Training hours per worker 
         
Internet/Intranet  3.04***  3.31***  2.06***  2.24*** 
  (0.98)  (0.93)  (0.76)  (0.72) 
         
Obs  1 095  1 042  1 083  907 
              
Notes:           
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses 
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(3) A separate OLS regression is run in each panel and for each occupational 
category. Each regression includes controls for plant size (dummy variable for 
plants  with  more  than  200  employees),  being  located  on  a  labour  market 
whose density is higher than the median, multi-establishment firms, public   25 
sector  companies,  listed  companies,  presence  of  union  delegates,  share  of 
women in the labour force, part-time work (dummy variable for firms with 
more than 5% of workers being part-time) and 15 sectors. Table 2  ICT adoption and alternative measures  
of internal vs external labour market strategies 
 






supervisors  Clerks  Blue collars 
         
  A. Exit rate 
         
Internet/Intranet  0.00  0.02  0.05  -0.03 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.07) 
         
Obs  1 090  1 094  1 104  1 046 
         
  B. Hiring rate 
         
Internet/Intranet  0.02  0.03*  0.06  -0.03 
  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.07) 
         
Obs  1 090  1 094  1 104  1 046 
         
 
Panel 2.2  ICT Adoption and promotion rates 
 
 
Promotion rate from 





from blue-collars or 




to managers and 
professionals 
       
 
       
Internet/Intranet  0.02***  0.05  0.11* 
  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.07) 
       
Obs  1 114  1 114  1 094 
       
Notes:           
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses 
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
(3) A separate OLS regression is run in each panel and for each occupational 
category or type of promotion. Each regression includes controls for plant size 
(dummy variable for plants with more than 200 employees), being located on 
a labour market whose density is higher than the median, multi-establishment 
firms, public sector companies, listed companies, presence of union delegates, 
share of women in the labour force, part-time work (dummy variable for firms 
with more than 5% of workers being part-time) and 15 sectors.   27 
Table 3.1 






supervisors  Clerks  Blue collars 
         
  A. Overall changes in the occupational structure 
         
Internet/Intranet  1.05***  -0.42  -0.20  -0.43 
  (0.26)  (0.35)  (0.26)  (0.39) 
         
Obs  641  641  641  641 
         
  B. Internal movements 
         
Internet/Intranet  0.80***  -0.16  -0.11  -0.53 
  (0.23)  (0.35)  (0.25)  (0.36) 
         
Obs  641  641  641  641 
         
  C. External movements 
         
Internet/Intranet  0.24  -0.15  -0.13  0.03 
  (0.19)  (0.23)  (0.17)  (0.29) 
         
Obs  641  641  641  641 
         
  D. Excess turnover 
         
Internet/Intranet  -1.07  4.04  10.31**  8.99* 
  (1.33)  (3.16)  (4.27)  (5.20) 
         
Obs  635  634  634  634 
         
  E. Number of trainees (per 100 workers) 
         
Internet/Intranet  8.68***  13.04***  8.03***  4.10** 
  (2.45)  (4.48)  (2.59)  (1.94) 
         
Obs  633  625  624  629 
         
  F. Training hours per worker 
         
Internet/Intranet  4.67***  4.40***  3.69***  1.85** 
  (1.27)  (1.12)  (1.07)  (0.82) 
         
Obs  631  620  622  629 
              
Notes:           
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses 
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
(3) A separate OLS regression is run in each panel and for each occupational 
category. Each regression includes controls for plant size (dummy  variable  for 
plants with more than 200 employees), being located on a labour market whose 
density  is  higher  than  the  median,  multi-establishment  firms,  public  sector 
companies, listed companies, presence of union delegates, share of women in the 
labour force, part-time work (dummy variable for firms with more than 5% of 
workers being part-time) and 7 manufacturing sub sectors.   28 
Table 3.2 






supervisors  Clerks  Blue collars 
         
  A. Overall changes in the occupational structure 
         
Internet/Intranet  1.07***  0.40  -1.37**  -0.10 
  (0.38)  (0.52)  (0.65)  (0.63) 
         
Obs  473  473  473  473 
         
  B. Internal movements 
         
Internet/Intranet  0.70*  0.53  -1.25*  0.03 
  (0.38)  (0.58)  (0.67)  (0.61) 
         
Obs  473  473  473  473 
         
  C. External movements 
         
Internet/Intranet  0.30  -0.34  0.04  -0.01 
  (0.30)  (0.43)  (0.43)  (0.44) 
         
Obs  473  473  473  473 
         
  D. Excess turnover 
         
Internet/Intranet  3.68  2.38  9.05  -32.38 
  (4.91)  (4.52)  (15.73)  (33.71) 
         
Obs  455  460  470  412 
         
  E. Number of trainees (per 100 workers) 
         
Internet/Intranet  -3.65  -0.20  2.51  4.34 
  (3.59)  (4.16)  (3.03)  (6.38) 
         
Obs  464  427  463  280 
         
  F. Training hours per worker 
         
Internet/Intranet  0.88  1.50  -0.27  2.93** 
  (1.51)  (1.63)  (1.04)  (1.42) 
         
Obs  464  422  461  278 
              
Notes:           
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses 
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
(3) A separate OLS regression is run in each panel and for each occupational category. Each 
regression includes controls for plant size (dummy variable for plants with more than 200 
employees), being located on a labour market whose density is higher than the median, multi-
establishment firms, public sector companies, listed companies, presence of union delegates, 
share of women in the labour force, part-time work (dummy variable for firms with more than 
5% of workers being part-time) and 8 service sub sectors. Table 4   
ICT Adoption and Skill Upgrading Channels:  






supervisors  Clerks  Blue collars 
         
  A. Overall changes in the occupational structure 
         
Internet/Intranet  0.45  1.01  -0.26  -1.20* 
  (0.51)  (0.69)  (0.64)  (0.70) 
Large  -0.12  1.03***  -0.29  -0.62 
  (0.20)  (0.30)  (0.33)  (0.40) 
Internet/Intranet x Large  -0.09  -0.89  0.99  -0.01 
  (0.49)  (0.64)  (0.63)  (0.66) 
High Density  0.25  -0.03  0.11  -0.33 
  (0.26)  (0.40)  (0.41)  (0.47) 
Internet/Intranet x High Density  0.65  -0.58  -1.15  1.08 
  (0.51)  (0.68)  (0.70)  (0.71) 
Services  -0.46*  -0.77**  0.32  0.91 
  (0.27)  (0.39)  (0.51)  (0.57) 
Internet/Intranet x Services  0.15  0.27  -0.88  0.46 
  (0.51)  (0.63)  (0.69)  (0.70) 
Hightech  -0.20  0.18  0.71**  -0.69 
  (0.33)  (0.38)  (0.35)  (0.47) 
Internet/Intranet x Hightech  0.77  -1.22*  -0.72  1.17* 
  (0.54)  (0.63)  (0.61)  (0.67) 
         
Obs  1 069  1 069  1 069  1 069 
         
  B. Internal movements 
         
Internet/Intranet  0.28  1.47**  -0.72  -1.02 
  (0.46)  (0.72)  (0.61)  (0.70) 
Large  -0.34  1.10***  -0.61*  -0.16 
  (0.21)  (0.32)  (0.35)  (0.37) 
Internet/Intranet x Large  0.13  -1.14*  1.14*  -0.13 
  (0.45)  (0.67)  (0.66)  (0.65) 
High Density  0.20  0.36  0.09  -0.65 
  (0.20)  (0.41)  (0.42)  (0.47) 
Internet/Intranet x High Density  0.89*  -1.02  -1.06  1.19* 
  (0.47)  (0.74)  (0.74)  (0.71) 
Services  -0.27  -0.46  -0.09  0.82 
  (0.29)  (0.42)  (0.50)  (0.53) 
Internet/Intranet x Services  -0.23  0.27  -0.67  0.64 
  (0.44)  (0.67)  (0.69)  (0.67) 
Hightech  -0.21  0.42  0.22  -0.43 
  (0.31)  (0.40)  (0.34)  (0.42) 
Internet/Intranet x Hightech  0.32  -1.12*  -0.12  0.92 
  (0.46)  (0.65)  (0.61)  (0.63) 
         
Obs  1 069  1 069  1 069  1 069 
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supervisors  Clerks  Blue collars 
         
  C. External movements 
         
Internet/Intranet  0.03  -0.32  0.62  -0.33 
  (0.38)  (0.53)  (0.43)  (0.55) 
Large  0.16  -0.09  0.41*  -0.48 
  (0.16)  (0.23)  (0.23)  (0.30) 
Internet/Intranet x Large  -0.04  0.11  -0.34  0.27 
  (0.35)  (0.47)  (0.41)  (0.50) 
High Density  0.06  -0.24  0.30  -0.12 
  (0.23)  (0.29)  (0.29)  (0.39) 
Internet/Intranet x High Density  -0.16  0.23  -0.25  0.18 
  (0.42)  (0.52)  (0.45)  (0.53) 
Services  -0.10  -0.20  0.12  0.18 
  (0.22)  (0.32)  (0.31)  (0.37) 
Internet/Intranet x Services  0.31  -0.13  -0.04  -0.14 
  (0.42)  (0.50)  (0.49)  (0.55) 
Hightech  0.04  -0.25  0.40  -0.19 
  (0.25)  (0.27)  (0.29)  (0.40) 
Internet/Intranet x Hightech  0.44  -0.01  -0.66  0.23 
  (0.40)  (0.45)  (0.43)  (0.53) 
         
Obs  1 069  1 069  1 069  1 069 
         
  D. Excess turnover 
         
Internet/Intranet  -1.84  1.38  -6.50  42.14* 
  (4.11)  (9.41)  (14.16)  (24.06) 
Large  -0.10  -12.14*  -22.73**  20.44 
  (4.28)  (7.04)  (8.97)  (35.89) 
Internet/Intranet x Large  -1.19  2.69  20.22  -49.99 
  (4.51)  (7.45)  (15.98)  (38.67) 
High Density  -3.47  -10.77**  -16.44*  -29.46 
  (4.32)  (5.05)  (9.64)  (22.23) 
Internet/Intranet x High Density  3.72  12.13**  43.37**  32.26 
  (5.53)  (5.53)  (21.76)  (22.83) 
Services  14.25**  19.60***  63.60***  49.40* 
  (5.70)  (5.45)  (9.84)  (26.43) 
Internet/Intranet x Services  3.55  -8.65  -18.48  -55.77* 
  (4.92)  (7.11)  (14.73)  (30.87) 
Hightech  1.18  1.10  0.61  -17.53** 
  (2.34)  (2.57)  (5.72)  (7.95) 
Internet/Intranet x Hightech  1.96  -2.74  -2.81  -2.98 
  (3.19)  (5.17)  (13.32)  (16.68) 
         
Obs  1 045  1 049  1 059  1 005 
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supervisors  Clerks  Blue collars 
         
  E. Number of trainees (per 100 workers) 
         
Internet/Intranet  12.13**  8.03  9.26*  3.76 
  (5.04)  (5.53)  (4.90)  (4.50) 
Large  12.36***  15.48***  8.53***  9.04* 
  (2.78)  (3.55)  (2.59)  (4.62) 
Internet/Intranet x Large  -5.27  -4.76  -2.50  -2.54 
  (4.36)  (5.30)  (4.32)  (5.51) 
High Density  -1.75  -1.45  -1.93  -0.17 
  (3.22)  (3.91)  (2.81)  (3.76) 
Internet/Intranet x High Density  2.39  3.98  0.98  -0.65 
  (4.56)  (5.50)  (4.41)  (4.94) 
Services  4.52  2.80  -2.14  8.18 
  (3.62)  (4.40)  (3.51)  (5.82) 
Internet/Intranet x Services  -16.02***  -7.73  -4.81  -3.00 
  (4.94)  (5.91)  (5.15)  (5.81) 
Hightech  -5.26  -5.42  1.95  3.59 
  (3.51)  (4.70)  (3.49)  (2.58) 
Internet/Intranet x Hightech  1.26  2.69  -1.97  2.39 
  (4.27)  (5.20)  (4.96)  (3.99) 
         
Obs  1 052  1 009  1 043  871 
         
  F. Training hours per worker 
         
Internet/Intranet  6.09**  2.91  3.79**  -1.19 
  (2.47)  (2.03)  (1.74)  (1.57) 
Large  6.73***  5.40***  3.59***  2.14*** 
  (1.33)  (1.25)  (0.91)  (0.74) 
Internet/Intranet x Large  -1.91  -0.20  -1.52  2.07 
  (2.13)  (2.06)  (1.72)  (1.47) 
High Density  0.32  0.28  0.82  0.18 
  (1.37)  (1.34)  (1.17)  (0.85) 
Internet/Intranet x High Density  -1.40  -0.32  -1.87  0.33 
  (2.12)  (2.18)  (1.67)  (1.84) 
Services  1.03  2.51*  1.45  0.06 
  (1.49)  (1.44)  (1.18)  (1.19) 
Internet/Intranet x Services  -4.44*  -2.01  -2.88*  2.35 
  (2.34)  (2.14)  (1.73)  (1.90) 
Hightech  1.32  1.94  2.34*  -0.56 
  (1.62)  (1.33)  (1.24)  (1.08) 
Internet/Intranet x Hightech  0.63  3.63*  1.54  2.80* 
  (2.14)  (1.95)  (1.85)  (1.62) 
         
Obs  1 051  1 001  1 040  869 
              
Notes:   
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
(2)  A  separate  OLS  regression  is  run  in  each  panel  and  for  each  occupational  category.  Each 
regression  includes  controls  for  plant  size  (dummy  variable  for  plants  with  more  than  200 
employees), multi-establishment firms, public sector companies, listed companies, presence of union 
delegates, share of women in the labour force, part-time work (dummy variable for firms with more 
than 5% of workers being part-time) and 15 sectors. 
(3) High Density indicates that local labour market density belongs to the highest quartile.   32 
(3) The coefficient for "Services" is computed as the difference between the coefficients for the 
eight 2-digit service sub sectors and the seven 2-digit manufacturing sub sectors, weighted by the 
shares of each sub sector. 









    All plants 
Internet/Intranet=0  Internet/Intranet=1  Manufacturing  Services 
Change of labor share (in %)           
  Managers and professionals  0.77  0.33  1.65  0.93  0,54 
  Technicians and supervisors  0.56  0.63  0.44  0.72  0,36 
  Clerks  -0.38  -0.15  -0.84  -0.27  -0,53 
  Blue collars  -0.95  -0.81  -1.24  -1.38  -0,37 
Change of labor share through internal movements (in %)         
  Managers and professionals  0.92  0.60  1.55  0.90  0,93 
  Technicians and supervisors  0.79  0.73  0.92  0.96  0,56 
  Clerks  -0.64  -0.38  -1.16  -0.41  -0,95 
  Blue collars  -1.07  -0.95  -1.31  -1.46  -0,55 
Change of labor share through entries and exits (in %)         
  Managers and professionals  -0.07  -0.18  0.15  0.07  -0,26 
  Technicians and supervisors  -0.13  0.00  -0.41  -0.17  -0,09 
  Clerks  0.18  0.13  0.29  0.14  0,25 
  Blue collars  0.02  0.04  -0.02  -0.04  0,10 
Excess turnover (in %)           
  Managers and professionals  24.12  25.04  22.29  18.54  31,89 
  Technicians and supervisors  25.13  27.38  20.67  13.95  40,55 
  Clerks  61.10  61.07  61.16  30.13  102,88 
  Blue collars  49.93  53.38  42.79  27.21  84,89 
Number of trainees per 100 workers           
  Managers and professionals  59.60  56.71  65.38  60.58  58,27 
  Technicians and supervisors  59.59  55.47  67.94  60.94  57,62 
  Clerks  41.27  37.88  48.06  43.82  37,83 
  Blue collars  34.18  32.04  39.14  34.17  34,22 
Hours of training per worker           
  Managers and professionals  21.45  19.54  25.24  22.70  19,75 
  Technicians and supervisors  19.45  17.55  23.30  19.97  18,69 
  Clerks  12.07  10.87  14.47  13.08  10,70 
  Blue collars  9.49  8.27  12.31  10.31  7,63 
             
Internet/Intranet  0,33  0.00  1.00  0.34  0.32 
             
Indicator for plant with more than 200 workers  0,53  0.48  0.62  0.62  0.40 
Indicator for dense local labor market  0,25  0.21  0.34  0.20  0.32 
Indicator for service sector  0,42  0.43  0.41  0.00  1.00 
Indicator for multi-establishment firm  0,60  0.57  0.66  0.63  0.56 
Indicator for public sector  0,03  0.03  0.05  0.02  0.05 
Indicator for listed company  0,43  0.38  0.54  0.55  0.27 
Indicator for presence of union delegates  0,77  0.76  0.81  0.84  0.69 
Share of women (%)  35,13  35.91  33.54  25.98  47.53 
Indicator for part-time work (>5% of 
workforce)  0,37  0.37  0.38  0.22  0.58 
             
Number of observations  1114  747  367  641  473 
 




In this appendix, we detail the key steps taken in preparing the data. The data sources are 
described in the data section in the text. In addition, the data on local labour market 
density  (the  number  of  employed  and  unemployed  workers  per  square  kilometres, 
computed over 348 local labour markets) comes from the 1990 population census. 
 
Merging the different datasets 
We  start  from  a  sample  of  2,975  plants  from  the  REPONSE  (1998)  survey,  with 
information on ICT adoption as well as key firm and plant characteristics. Matching the 
RESPONSE sample with the DMMO-EMMO, ESE and 24-83 sources yields a sample of 
1,537 plants. 
The relatively low matching rate (53%) is due, in particular, to the fact that the EMMO is 
not an exhaustive data source (plants are sampled at a rate that depends on their size) and 
that the 24-83 fiscal forms are not systematically coded.  
In order to achieve this matching rate, we extrapolate some of the missing data, using the 
following procedures: 
-  when a plant is only present for 1 (resp. 2) of the 3 years in the 24-83 database, 
we compute the training variables as averages over 1 (resp. 2) years instead of 3; 
-  when a plant is missing for some quarters in a given year in the EMMO-DMMO 
data, we extrapolate the entries and exits in each occupation from the entries and 
exits observed during the rest of the year; if a plant is missing during one (or two) 
of the three years, we extrapolate entries and exits from the other years. 
Though these extrapolations introduce measurement error in the movement and training 
variables,  this  does  not  bias  the  estimates  as  these  are  dependent  variables  in  the 
regressions  (it  might,  however,  make  them  less  precise).  Moreover,  we  checked  that 
restricting the sample to those plants that have complete DMMO-EMMO information 
does not significantly alter the results. Our results are indeed a little less precise when 
using extrapolated information. The point estimates are generally a bit smaller, but not 
significantly.  
In order to get information on investment rates and on ICT expenditure, we match our 
main dataset with the EAE. Given that the EAE is not exhaustive, we end up with 874 
firms in this subsample. So, we only use it to conduct robustness checks. 
 
Outliers and consistency checks 
It appeared that for some of the plants, the training information had been misreported 
(possibly inverted) for skilled and unskilled blue collars in 1997 and 1998, leading to 
implausible training rates. As we lacked information to correct the errors, we decided to 
aggregate the two categories in a single blue-collar occupation. In addition to this, a few 
observations had outlying values for the number of trainees for some years. We corrected 
these observations when possible, or set them to missing.   35 
We  then  performed  several  consistency  checks  on  this  1537  plant  sample.  First,  we 
checked that the total plant size declared in the ESE does not differ too much from the 
one declared in the DMMO-EMMO sources, at the beginning and at the end of our period 
(Dec 31, 1995 and Dec 31, 1998). We drop all plants for which the difference is more 
than 20% or represents at least 10 workers. We tested the robustness of our results to 
other thresholds; the main findings are not affected.  
Second, we checked for outliers in the changes in the occupational structure. We dropped 
plants for which the sum of the absolute changes in the share of the different occupations 
is more than 60% and represents more than 10 workers. The results are not sensitive to 
using a stricter threshold. 
With these filters, the benchmark sample has 1,114 plants. Dropping any kind of filter 
and using the 1537 observations does not significantly impact our results on training, but 
does  affect  those  concerning  internal  and  external  movements.  However,  once  a 
minimum level of consistency across data sources is required, the tightness of the filters 
we use does not matter. 
Last,  we  also  considered  a  sample  where  we  restricted  upward  internal  mobility  for 
managers and professionals and downward internal mobility for unskilled blue collars. 
The idea is that managers cannot be downgraded and that no one can be promoted to an 
unskilled blue collar position. We first consider a strict limit, but as it appears that the 
median  of  internal  promotion  for  unskilled  workers  was  0  (though  obviously  not 
symmetrically distributed), we eventually settle to a less strict limit (+/-2) allowing for 
measurement errors (in the first case the sample contains about 550 observations, and 
about 950 in the second case). When using the strict rule, results do shift a bit, but the 
sample size is also divided by 2. However, when using the less strict rule of +/-2, results 
are in line with our benchmark.  
 
Sample selection 
Our main sample being constructed by matching 5 different sources, sample selectivity 
may be an issue.  
First, a few observations may be lost due to the matching procedure. Firms are matched 
on  a  national  firm  identifier  (SIREN),  managed  by  the  French  statistical  institute 
(INSEE). A few identifier changes may occur over the 3-year period, in particular due to 
mergers; it is however reasonable to put these firms aside, as the merger may disrupt the 
link between HR management practices and technology adoption.  
More importantly, the main reason for the relatively low matching rate (53%) is that 2 of 
the  5  main  datasets  (EMMO  and  24-83)  are  not  exhaustive.  In  these  two  datasets, 
however, we have random sampling of the total population, with sampling probabilities 
varying by firm size. Sample selectivity bias is therefore not an issue, even though the 
analysis sample is not representative of the initial population anymore. Instead of using 
sampling weights in the analysis, we prefer to check the robustness of our estimates by 
stratifying the sample (or adding interaction terms) in two key dimensions: firms’ size 
and firms’ industry (services vs. manufacturing).    36 
A second concern is that, by construction, only firms surviving over the 1996-98 periods 
can be used in the analysis. We cannot rule out sample selectivity issues here. As we do 
not observe ICT adoption at the beginning of the period, it is not possible to analyse the 
selective survival of firms, or to implement sample selectivity corrections. The discussion 
of the possible bias is somewhat speculative. However, we believe that, if anything, our 
key  finding  should  be  reinforced.  What  we  are  particularly  missing  are  the  external 
movements that would appear if some firms were shrinking instead of closing. A likely 
hypothesis is that firms that do not adopt ICT are less likely to survive, so that we are 
disproportionately  missing  external  movements  among  non-adopters.  We  therefore 
probably overestimate the correlation between external movements and ICT adoption. 
Consequently, it seems that correcting for sample selectivity would reinforce our finding 
that internal labour markets play a larger role than the external labour market in a context 
of ICT adoption. 
 